Taking Moral Decisions: From Casuistry to Deliberation

Authors

  • Diego Gracia Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Abstract

Casuistry has a history that must be known in order to give to the concept a precise meaning. Casuistry cannot be identified with any case analysis procedure, but only with the one that enjoyedan enormous historical fortune in Western culture. In the base of this moral method is a logical problem, which this article attempts to bring to light. Its conclusion is that casuistry has been biased by an improper logic, being that its most important difference with deliberation, a much more right procedure for making moral decisions.

Author Biography

Diego Gracia, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Catedrático Emérito. Director de la Fundación Xavier Zubiri.

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Published

2016-01-30

How to Cite

Gracia, D. (2016). Taking Moral Decisions: From Casuistry to Deliberation. Dilemata, (20), 15–31. Retrieved from https://dilemata.net/revista/index.php/dilemata/article/view/420

Issue

No. 20 (2016): Nuevos ensayos sobre la Casuística

Section

Debate

License

All contents of this electronic edition, except where otherwise noted, are licensed under a “Creative Commons Reconocimiento-No Comercial 3.0 Spain” (CC-by-nc).